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Introduction
Major international sporting events such as the World Cup and the Olympics generate
billions of dollars in revenue and carry price tags for hosting of at least a similar amount. Of
course, as with any business venture where billions of dollars are on the line, the potential for
corruption is very real, and history is full of examples of both proven and alleged acts of
corruption in the process of bidding for mega-events and well as during the construction and
preparation stages. Due to their international prominence and the number of well-publicized
scandals in recent years, this chapter focuses primarily on the Olympic Games and the
Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup; however, the lessons
learned in examining these tournaments can be applied to other smaller-scale events.
Corruption has been a part of mega-events since the very earliest days of these
competitions. The modern Olympic Games take their name from the most of famous of the
ancient Greek athletic competitions and were first played in 776 BCE. Indeed, the mythological
origin of the ancient Olympics itself is deeply mired in a tale of deceit and corruption. Pelops,
son of King Tantalus of Lydia, sought to win the hand of Hippodamia, the daughter of King
Oenomaus of Pisa. The king required all suitors to beat him in a chariot race and had killed each
of his daughter’s previous eighteen admirers during the race. In an act that makes modern
accusations of bribing judges or the use of performance-enhancing drugs seem somewhat tame
by comparison, Pelops won the race by sabotaging the king’s chariot, replacing the bronze axle
with one made of beeswax, killing the king, and thereby winning both the hand of Hippodamia
as well as the throne of Pisa.
After his victory, Pelops organized funeral games at Olympia in order to thank the gods
and honor Oenomaus. It is from these competitions that the ancient Olympic Games were
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inspired. Furthermore, in order to dispel the notion that he had competed in the race for personal
gain, Pelops turned down the traditional prize of gold. Instead, he accepted a crown made of
olive branches, beginning the tradition of amateurism in the Olympics. The ancient Olympics
awarded olive wreaths to winning athletes to symbolize what were supposed to be the pure
motives of the competitors (Leeds, Matheson, and von Allmen, 2018).
Of course, just as the issue of amateurism was a constant source of concern in the modern
Olympics until the full acceptance of professional athletes in the early 1990s, so too were ancient
Olympic athletes amateurs in name only. As early at 600 BCE, winners from Athens were
awarded 500 drachmai, equivalent to two years in wages of the typical artisan (Gow, 1898). By
the 5th century BCE, top competitors could support themselves entirely through athletics
(Perrotet, 2004, pg. 53). Following the Roman takeover of Greece in 146 BCE, the Olympics
became fully professionalized. Of course, no economist would state that paying athletes for their
services amounts to corruption. However, paying athletes for their performances while
simultaneously extolling the virtues of amateurism is unseemly at best, and compensating
athletes for their talents when such payments are plainly against the rules, is clearly naked
corruption.1 All in all, it is obvious that corruption in sports is not solely a modern phenomenon.
The ancient Greek Olympics were disbanded in 393 CE when the Christian Emperor
Theodosius, banned all pagan celebrations throughout the Roman Empire. Frenchman Pierre de
Coubertin revived the Games in 1896, adopting the Olympic name and the amateurism ideals.
The Summer Games have been held every four years ever since except in certain years due to
World Wars. A winter version of the tournament was added in 1924. The International Olympic
Committee (IOC) selects a host city from a large number of bidders roughly seven years in the
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The term “naked corruption” is apt when discussing the ancient Olympics as athletes in ancient Greece competed
while nude.
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advance of the event, and typically the location had rotated among large wealthy Western cities
in Europe, North America, and Australia. As noted by Baade and Matheson (2016), more
recently an increasing number of bids have come from developing nations with Beijing being
selected as host of the Summer Games in 2008 followed by Rio in 2016. Beijing will host the
Winter Games in 2022.
FIFA was formed a few years after the IOC in 1904 in an attempt to organize the various
national football associations in Europe and later Latin America. Disagreements with the IOC
about the use of professional athletes led to the creation of the World Cup, first held in Uruguay
in 1930. Like with the Olympics Games, the World Cup is held every 4 years and has
traditionally rotated between Europe and Latin America, the two major historical centers of
football prowess. Like with the IOC, the FIFA World Cup began expanding its geographical
footprint in the 1994 when the United States held the event for the first time. South Korea and
Japan and South Africa quickly followed suit. The event returned to South America in 2014 for
the first time in nearly four decades when Brazil hosted the tournament. Russia will host in 2018
followed by, quite controversially, Qatar in 2022.

Corruption in bidding for mega-events
Hosting a mega-event like the Olympics or the World Cup brings a variety of perceived
benefits to a country, both tangible and intangible. Boosters of such events promise that they will
prove to be an economic windfall, especially in the tourism and construction industries. These
benefits turn out to be very difficult to measure ex post, much less predict in advance (Matheson,
2006), but they can still create an allure around hosting a mega-event.
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A successful mega-event can also promote a country’s reputation on the world stage, and
instill patriotism and civic pride at home (Malfas et al. 2004). Of course, poorly run events will
have the opposite effect, and disorganization or corruption may lead a country to regret hosting a
mega-event. Nevertheless, it is easy to romanticize the Olympics or the World Cup, so national
governments are often eager to host them.
When the bidding system is operating smoothly, these enticements cause a country to
submit a bid and try to earnestly convince the selection committee of their country’s merit.
Sometimes, the prize for hosting seems too great for the process to be left up to chance, and a
government who wishes to host will conspire to unlawfully influence the selection committee.
This influence may transparently be a quid pro quo bribe where money is offered in exchange for
a vote on where the event should be held, or it could be more discrete. The payment is often
structured as a donation to the sports program that is run by a member of a selection committee,
sometimes with an assumption that the committee member will be able to steal the money for
personal gain along the way.
The World Cup has been plagued by scandals surrounding the selection of a host city in
the past two decades. In 2010, FIFA simultaneously chose sites for the 2018 and 2022 World
Cups, and the validity of this vote has been questioned ever since. No evidence of direct cashfor-votes schemes was ever found; however, journalists at the Sunday Times disguised as soccer
officials were able to convince members of the selection committee to accept bribes in return for
voting for England for the 2018 host, which raised questions of integrity in the voting system. In
addition, the Qatari government gave gifts to members of the Executive Committee, although
there is no evidence that it was part of an explicit quid pro quo.
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The bidding process for the 2002 Summer Olympics in Salt Lake City also featured a
wide array of inappropriate gifts. Ten members of the International Olympics Committee
resigned after ethics investigations, and the two leaders of the Salt Lake City’s bid committee
were eventually indicted (but acquitted) on felony bribery charges (Hemphill, 2003).

Corruption in World Cup Bidding
A ‘pay to win’ mentality was established in inaugural World Cup in 1930 and would
continue in subsequent competitions. Uruguay won the right to host the 1930 tournament by
agreeing to fully pay for the travel costs of all of the participating teams, and to build a grand
new stadium, the Estadio Centenario, for the event. In a case of somewhat ominous
foreshadowing, the Estadio Centenario was not completed in time for the start of the tournament
so that the first round of games had to be played at an alternative site (Molinaro, 2009). Of
course, offering to host the most lavish tournament is not illegal, nor is it even necessarily
unethical, but it highlights the notion that countries with deep enough pockets willing pay the
price to host the event will get favorable treatment from FIFA or the IOC. To the extent that
these events benefit some local sectors in the economy, such as the sports, hospitality, and heavy
construction industries, at the expense of others, these events can serve as a massive wealth
redistribution scheme which can be promoted through either legal or illegal methods.
World Cup bidding scandals began to emerge in the late 1990s and well into this
millennium. Allegations of past bribery were made public in 2015 when the Chuck Blazer, who
died in 2017, admitted to facilitating a bribe relating to the 1998 World Cup. FIFA executive
Jack Warner was the recipient of the bribe from Morocco, whose organizing committee hoped to
secure the hosting privileges. This was the first of multiple instances of bribery that were alleged
5

against members of FIFA by Blazer, who had become an informant for the FBI regarding the
matter (Gibson and Lewis, 2015).
Blazer revealed that there was a larger scheme years later in the selection of the 2010 host
of the Cup. According to US prosecutors, a payment of $10 million was taken from the South
African organizing committee and deposited into a bank account linked to Jack Warner in
exchange for votes. In addition to criminal charges filed by the FBI regarding the matter, FIFA
has filed a restitution request citing this case of bribery as well as that of 1998 (Gibson and
Lewis 2015; FIFA 2016).
Similar allegations were made with regards to the 2006 World Cup in Germany by the
weekly news magazine Der Spiegel. In an investigation undertaken by the magazine, evidence of
a slush fund emerged. The purpose of this fund was allegedly to secure votes required to win the
hosting privileges for the Cup. Der Spiegel suggests that the former CEO of Adidas, Robert
Louis-Dreyfus gave the funds to the German organizing committee in order to facilitate the bribe
(Spiegel Online, 2015).
This section will focus primarily on the 2018 and 2022 World Cups, because the scandals
in the bidding process have captured the public attention more so than other recent scandals.
Much of what we know comes from the “Report on the Inquiry into the 2018/2022 FIFA World
Cup Bidding Process,” written by Michael J. Garcia and Cornel Borbély (2017). They were
respectively the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of FIFA’s Investigatory Chamber, which is an
independent branch of FIFA responsible for oversight.
The report, colloquially known as the Garcia Report, was commissioned in June 2012,
and submitted to FIFA officials in November 2014. Initially, FIFA released only a summary of
the Garcia Report, and claimed the report had found that the voting process had not been
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corrupted. Garcia himself disagreed and pleaded for the full report to be published, and stated
that his team had uncovered “serious and wide-ranging issues” (Keh, 2017), but FIFA refused to
publish the report. On June 26, 2017, the German newspaper Bild announced that they had the
full report and intended to publish it; FIFA experienced a nearly instantaneous change of heart,
and released the full text the following day. FIFA stated, “For the sake of transparency, FIFA
welcomes the news that this report has now been finally published,” without mentioning that
they were the organization preventing its publication or acknowledging Bild’s role (FIFA, 2017).
The first significant moment in the bidding process occurred in December 2008 when
FIFA’s leadership announced they would simultaneously choose the sites for the 2018 and 2022
World Cups. The motivation was financial: the financial crisis of 2008 was underway, and the
Secretary General of FIFA, Jérôme Valcke, said that he feared that sponsors of the WC would
“use the current situation [financial crisis] in order to argue that it’s not very clear or it’s not
clear enough where the World Cups would be played” and would “try to reduce the current price
they were paying to FIFA” (Garcia and Borbély, 2017, p. 25).
The 2018 location was chosen by the votes of the Executive Committee in December
2010, and then the 2022 location was chosen immediately after. There were supposed to be 24
voting members, but two had been removed because they had been willing to accept bribes by
the aforementioned undercover journalists at the Sunday Times of London. The countries (or
pairs of countries) that would submit bids were Belgium/Holland (2018), England (2018), Russia
(2018), Spain/Portugal (2018), US (2022), Australia (2022), Japan (2022), Korea (2022), Qatar
(2022). FIFA had previously committed to holding the 2018 World Cup in Europe, and this
splitting of the field between 2018 and 2022 inadvertently created an environment conducive to
illegal vote-swapping, where a European country could coordinate with a non-European country.
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A number of newspaper articles reported that Spain/Portugal promised to support Qatar for the
2022 World Cup in exchange for Qatar supporting Spain/Portugal for 2018, but the Garcia
Report states that no conclusive evidence has been presented that this collusion occurred. The
Japanese bid team, apparently unaware that trading votes is expressly against FIFA rules, filed a
report with the Investigatory Commission that they “examined the possibility to barter with host
country candidates of 2018 for votes” (Garcia and Borbély 2017, p. 326), but had not followed
through.
The clearest evidence that members of Executive Committee were open to selling their
votes was provided by journalists at the Sunday Times (2010). They published extensive
reporting with a wide range of soccer officials stating that bribes were commonplace, and then
went one step further by posing as businesspeople and offering bribes to two Committee
members, Amos Adamu and Reynald Temarii. According to the Times, both men agreed. FIFA
agreed that the evidence was damning, and Adamu and Temarii were subsequently stripped of
their voting rights on the Executive Committee (although Temarii has disputed the allegations).
There is evidence that Qatar, which was eventually chosen as the site of the 2022 World
Cup provided gifts that were against FIFA rules. The Emir of Qatar, Hamad bin Khalifa Al
Thani, met with at least three members of the Executive Committee in January 2010 in Brazil.
Andreas Bleicher, who served as a consultant on the Qatar bid team, said, “[P]eople say in Qatar
when His Highness travels, everybody he will meet will get a gift,” and added that it is typically
“a nice gift” (Garcia and Borbély 2017, p. 165). The Executive Committee members are not
allowed to receive “gifts and other benefits that exceed the average relative value of local
customs” or any cash (FIFA, 2009, pg. 8). These gifts were almost certainly against FIFA rules,
but they do stop short of the outright selling of votes.
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If these gifts were not part of a quid pro quo, should the public be concerned about them?
After all, gifts are only problematic to the degree that they influence the ultimate decision about
where to hold the games. There are three reasons that they may in fact have been used to
influence the members of the Executive Committee. The first, and most pedestrian reason is that
they may have in fact been part of an explicit exchange of gifts for votes, and this evidence was
not uncovered. The second reason is that Committee members may preside over multiple World
Cups over the course of their careers. Even in the absence of an explicit agreement, there is an
incentive for an unscrupulous Committee member to establish a reputation as voting for
whichever country gives him or her the best “gifts.” Finally, there is a natural human tendency to
repay kindness with kindness even when there is no tangible benefit to reciprocation (Fehr and
Gächter, 2000). This “golden rule” is laudable in most avenues of life, but gift-givers can rely on
the tendency to reciprocate to distort the location of a mega-event.
Qatari citizen Mohamed Bin Hammam played an unusual role in the Qatari bid as well.
For most countries submitting a bid with a representative on the Executive Committee, that
person acted as the head of the bid team and its strongest cheerleader. Bin Hammam was on the
Executive Committee, but his feelings of his home country’s candidacy were ambivalent. He
initially recommended against Qatar, before eventually supporting the bid.
Bin Himmam also made a large number of improper payments in the $10,000 to $50,000
to various officials associated with Confédération Africaine de Football (CAF), a branch of
FIFA. In addition, he paid $1.2 million to FIFA Vice President and Executive Committee
member Jack Warner (Garcia and Borbély, 2017), and these payments were reported in
contemporaneous newspaper articles as proof that Qatar had paid to win the bid. Garcia and
Borbély present convincing evidence that these newspaper articles were mistaken, and that Bin
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Hammam was in fact paying bribes to win the position of FIFA president. Hardly a shining
moment for the integrity of FIFA, but it is probably preferable to evidence that Qatar did pay for
World Cup votes.

Corruption in Olympics Bidding
Suspicion also followed the selection of Nagano for the 1998 Winter Olympics. In the
midst of the selection process, a large donation was made by Nagano’s local organizing
committee in order to help build a museum for the Olympic Games. Following the securing of
hosting rights, the organizing committee burned all documentation regarding the bidding (Jordan
and Sullivan, 1999). This suspicious behavior that went relatively unquestioned led to attempts at
the more scandalous behavior to come in the selection of the 2002 Winter Olympics location of
Salt Lake City.
The finalist cities for the 2002 Winter Games were Salt Lake City, Utah, United States;
Sion, Switzerland; Östersund, Sweden; and Quebec City, Canada. On June 16, 1995, Salt Lake
City won handily on the first ballot of voting, with 54 votes compared to a total of 35 votes for
the other three cities combined. It was an auspicious start to a selection process that would
become blanketed in scandal, eventually leading to the resignation of 10 members of the
International Olympic Committee (IOC), and the indictment of the two leaders of the Salt Lake
City bid team on bribery charges.
The first allegations of corruption surfaced over three years after the selection of Salt
Lake City as the host of the games. On November 24, 1998, the KTVX television station of Salt
Lake City reported on the existence of a letter showing that the Salt Lake Organizing Committee
(SLOC) was paying for Sonia Essomba to attend American University in Washington, D.C. Why
was the Salt Lake City bid committee paying for someone’s tuition? SLOC chair Bob Garff
10

described the payments as an innocent “humanitarian effort,” a claim that was deeply undercut
by the fact that Sonia Essomba’s father was René Essomba, a member of the IOC who voted on
the site for the 2002 Winter Games (Associated Press, 1999). In a fitting twist, the letter itself
appears to have been a forgery (IOC, 1999), but the underlying accusation was correct (Mallon,
2000).
IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch asked that the IOC Juridical Commission
investigate the tuition payments made on behalf of the Essomba family. Upon the
recommendation of the IOC’s Juridical Commission, Samaranch set up an independent
commission to investigate any improper conduct by members of the committee. The
commission, commonly called the Pound Commission after its chair, Richard Pound, found a
wide range of behavior by IOC members that violated IOC rules and eroded public trust in the
bidding process.
For example, SLOC paid for over $17,000 in medical treatments for family members at
Intermountain Healthcare in Salt Lake City (IOC, 1999). Payments often took this form, with
Salt Lake City officials paying for services rather than paying cash directly to IOC members.
Perhaps this was to establish an alternate motivation if the payments were discovered -- paying
for someone’s college tuition or hospital bills seems more noble than handing over a cartoonish
bag of money. Indeed, it turned out that Sonia Essomba was far from the only family member of
an IOC member whose tuition was being paid by SLOC. There were a total of 13 people who
had received “scholarships,” from the SLOC, with a total value of nearly $400,000. At least six
of these recipients were revealed to be close family members of IOC members (Mallon, 2000).
Some IOC members were paid in cash for typically smaller amounts than the large sums
spent on education. SLOC employed consultants, whose responsibilities included orchestrating
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meetings with IOC members, and sometimes passing along payments. One payment of $7,000
was made through a consultant to the fictitious Zema Gadir, allegedly the daughter of Sudanese
IOC Member Zein El-Abdin Mohamed Ahmed Abdel Gadir. Gadir later admitted that he had
received the payments himself and that he had no daughter, with Zema being formed from his
own initials.

Corruption in the Organization of a Mega-event
After a country wins the right to host a major sporting event such as the Olympics or
World Cup, large-scale construction projects begin in order to make the hosting feasible. New
stadiums are built and existing ones are restructured in order to hold each event. New
infrastructure is often built as well. Roads and public transit may be upgraded for the
encroaching influx of spectators and athletes.
A large mega-event can often serve as a trigger for the construction of additional
tangentially related public structures. These may include commercial centers, common areas, or
other projects that may enhance the physical appearance of the host city or nation. This
governmental mission creep has historically led to cost overrun in the hosting of such events.
Every Olympics between 1968 and 2012 wound up with final costs exceeding original estimates
with the median Games running 150 percent over budget. Montreal in 1976 and Sarajevo in 1984
were the worst offenders with final costs ending up more than ten times the initial estimates
(Flyvbjerg and Stewart, 2012).
Failure to meet budgetary estimates suggests significant economic difficulties in
organizing these events, but does not necessarily imply that corruption is a primary driver of the
problem. For example, the 2012 London organizers won the bid with a budget estimate of £2.4
12

billion, but this figure was revised upwards two years later to £9.3 as local officials began to
include major urban renewal projects into the planning for the Games (Baade and Matheson,
2016).2
However, recent allegations and investigations in several host countries of mega-events
suggest that simple cost overrun may not be the only problem of concern. In fact, it may be a
symptom of a more serious issue. These large funding opportunities for contractors have resulted
in the potential for illicit collusion, negligence, and unnecessary costs both before and after the
games are hosted. The following sections will examine such costs and behavior as they appear in
each part of the local organizational process.

Corruption in the Awarding of Contracts
Before preparations can begin, companies must compete to win the construction contracts
being awarded by the host government for the various projects in preparation for the event. A
competition between firms such as this incentivizes each to offer the highest quality at the lowest
cost, which allows the host to pay as little as possible for the contract.
Despite the theoretical prowess of this system, it encounters errors when conflicts of
interest and illicit actions are introduced. Politicians and local organizers willing to accept bribes
and befriend businessmen allow the potential for self-interested action, rather than action in the
best interest of the host country.
In 2014, The Anti-Corruption Foundation, a Russian non-profit organization, released a
report which listed personal relationships between Sochi Olympics construction contract
recipients and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. He is said to be friends with the two recipients of
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Somewhat laughably, when the final bill came to only £8.77 billion, the organizers claimed the event came in
under budget despite costing 265 percent more than initially advertised.

13

the largest contracts, Vladimir Yakunin and Arkadiy Rotenberg. Yakunin is the former head of
Russian Railways, the company which received about $10 billion in contracts for the Sochi
Olympics (Anti-Corruption Foundation, 2014).
It has since been revealed that this company has a history that would put this funding in
jeopardy. According to an investigation by the broadcasting organization Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, Russian Railways is guilty of suspicious actions in the process of hiring
subcontractors. Investigators found evidence of contracts being awarded without a bidding
process or authorization, often for inflated prices (Khazov-Cassia, 2016). The cost of these
contracts is then the responsibility of the Russian treasury, as Russian Railways is a state-owned
company.
Putin’s second friend and former Judo sparring partner, Arkadiy Rotenberg, has
historically been a major recipient of funding from the Putin administration, according to the US
treasury (Reuters, 2015). Rotenberg’s company, Stroygazmontazh, is one of the largest
subcontractors hired by the state-owned natural gas company Gazprom in preparation for the
games.
Questions akin to those faced by Russia have been asked of Brazil in the hosting of both
the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics in Rio. Since hosting the World Cup,
investigations have been launched concerning six of the twelve stadiums used in the games.
These stadiums are being investigated for financial irregularities and allegations of bribery. The
chairman of Odebrecht, a Brazilian construction and chemical conglomerate, admitted that the
Corinthians Arena was a “gift” in exchange for many contracts given to the company by the
Brazilian government. The company’s former chief executive Marcelo Odebrecht confirmed
these allegations in documents released in a plea deal. He stated that “there was a request from
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[President Lula] to my father: Help Corinthians to have its private stadium.” In addition to this,
Lula has been accused of taking R$15 million (≈ $4.8 million USD) in return for awarding
lucrative contracts to Odebrecht (Chade, 2017).
In the Summer Olympics held two years later financial irregularities emerged again.
Federal prosecutor Leandro Mitidieri disclosed that an investigation was underway into
criminality in the preparation for the Olympic Games in Rio. The police have already found
documents mentioning R$1 million (≈ $320,000 USD) in bribes paid by Odebrecht for
construction contracts (Brooks, 2016).
In addition to the potential to gain from awarding contracts for construction or services
associated with the execution of the event, organizers have been accused of taking bribes in
exchange for marketing and television rights. Major allegations of this nature emerged after the
publication of FOUL!: the Secret World of Fifa; Bribes, Vote Rigging and Ticket Scandals in
2006. The book, written by reporter Andrew Jennings, became the first of many major
investigations into the organizational corruption of FIFA. Later that year, Jennings helped in the
production of an episode of Panorama, a British investigative news show, on the same topic
(Miller, 2015). Panorama’s investigation revealed that former employees of the defunct Swiss
sports company International Sports and Leisure (ISL) claimed to have bribed FIFA in exchange
for lucrative marketing contracts. These allegations were confirmed by company financial
records, which were examined by liquidators after ISL had declared bankruptcy (Jennings,
2006).
After receiving the documentation that Jennings had discovered and retaining Chuck
Blazer as an informant, the FBI carried out a formal investigation into the corruption within
FIFA and its continental confederations CONCACAF AND CONMEBOL (Miller, 2015). In
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May of 2015, the investigation was made public. A total of 41 entities were indicted with charges
including wire fraud and money laundering. The FBI alleges that over $200 million in bribes and
kickbacks was taken in exchange for marketing and media contracts concerning the World Cup
as well as other international soccer tournaments (US Department of Justice, 2015a; 2015b).
Following the first announcement of multiple indictments, Sepp Blatter stepped down as
president of the FIFA executive committee (McLaughlin, 2015). Though he cited a need for a
“complete overhaul” in ethics as the reason for leaving, Blatter was one of those who were
implicated in the FBI’s press release concerning their investigation. His predecessor in the
position of president has confirmed the allegations, saying that Blatter had full knowledge of the
bribes that were taking places while he was working for FIFA as General Secretary (BBC, 2015;
Owen, 2015).
Questionable integrity could potentially continue in FIFA leadership. The president to
follow Blatter has also been accused of having a history of bribery and corruption. According to
the Panama Papers, a compilation of leaked documents from law firm Mossack Fonseca, the
recently elected Gianni Infantino was involved in suspicious deals, including one with Traffic
Sports Europe, a company whose USA branch, international branch, and former CEO have all
plead guilty to the FBI’s charges of bribery in exchange for contracts (Gibson, 2016a).

Corruption in Construction
Once preparation has been completed, construction may begin. The contracted
construction companies are given a deadline with little to no flexibility and must work with
speed to be finished in time for the events. This can potentially lead to poor working conditions
for laborers as firms attempt to increase productivity or decrease costs. This maltreatment of
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laborers was revealed by a 2013 report published by Human Rights Watch. It described the
conditions of those employed in the construction of the 2014 Olympic Games in Sochi. Among
their findings was the withholding of wages and personal identification documents to force
employees to stay (Buchanan, 2013). These were issues, they argued, for which the Russian
government was ultimately responsible.
The hosting governments are not the only entities who have been accused of such
negligence. In 2017, Human Rights Watch published another report examining the human rights
abuses in the preparation of the 2018 World Cup to be held in Saint Petersburg. During this time,
FIFA admitted that it had full knowledge of the poor working conditions present in Saint
Petersburg but apparently did not intervene. The report stated that seventeen deaths had already
occurred in the construction of the Russian stadiums (Buchanan, 2017; Conn, 2017).
These allegations of abuse continue to arise with regards to the hosting of the World Cup.
Amnesty International has accused Qatari contractors of human rights abuses including forced
labor and withholding of payments in preparation for the 2022 World Cup (Amnesty
International, 2016). FIFA commissioned a report on the potential abuses, which confirmed the
allegations. The authors of the report urged FIFA to include human rights as a criterion in its bid
process for finding host countries (Gibson, 2016b).
According to the OECD, this maltreatment of laborers and poor working conditions could
be explained by a contractor’s goal of recuperating the money used to bribe a local organizing
committee in exchange for a contract. The OECD reports that contractors offering bribes will
attempt to recuperate the money using substandard material for the building project and billing
for work that was not performed along with other cost-cutting acts (OECD, 2016). In addition to
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this being costly for the host government and laborers hired, it may also be hazardous, because
the substandard building material has the potential to be structurally unsound.

Corruption and Cost-Overrun in Long-Term Management of Stadiums
In addition to high costs and corruption in the preparation for sports events, there is also a
potential for large long-term costs from behavior both illicit and not. Buildings that no longer
have a use become “white elephants.” These structures become burdensome to the hosting
government, which must continue to pay upkeep. This cost inevitably results in increased
government debt and higher taxes for citizens.
The prosecutor Leandro Mitidieri, tasked with investigation the Rio 2016 Olympic
Games, published a report which spoke of the structures built for the games. Mitidieri claims
they were built with “no planning” (Associated Press, 2017). Many of these stadiums are no
longer used. Some are boarded up and have fallen into disrepair. The upkeep of such facilities is
now the Brazilian government’s responsibility, making the citizens ultimately responsible for
paying the upkeep of these unused structures.
While concerns are raised about the costs of disuse in Brazil, the costs of use carry more
emphasis in London. Sadiq Khan, the mayor of London, has launched a probe into rising costs
associated with the conversion of the former London Olympic stadium to a football arena for
West Ham United, a premier league football team from the area. West Ham have agreed to pay
15 million for the building after the conversion, leaving the rest of the 323£ million (≈ $427
million USD) largely a responsibility of the government and its taxpayers (Gibson, 2016c).
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Prevention of Corruption
Corruption, negligence, and cost overrun can potentially surface in many parts of the
hosting process. This means that it is paramount to use a multi-faceted approach in the
prevention of such action which can be applied to each step in the hosting process. In order to
ensure the prevention of illicit behavior at each stage, the incentive to act out of self-interest
must be decreased or the behavior must be prevented entirely.
The potential for corruption begins with the host country selection process. Members of
the head organizational committee (e.g. FIFA’s executive committee) act as principals for the
interests of the committee and FIFA at large; however, in addition to the motivation to do what is
in the interest of the organization, they also have the motivation to act in self-interest. Thus, if a
local organizing committee or other entity offers a bribe on behalf of a given country, a
principal-agent problem arises in which a member’s interests no longer align with those of the
organization. This also appears in the awarding of marketing and TV broadcasting rights.
The principal-agent problem continues in the awarding of contracts for construction and
event services by the host country. Local organizing committees are tasked with awarding
contracts and payments for which any one committee member has no direct responsibility.
Instead, these costs are the responsibility of the local committee as an organization, the host
government and, by extension, the taxpayers.
The OECD suggests that two of the most effective ways to prevent corruption in public
procurement are through sanctions and transparency (OECD, 2016). Since the awarding of
contracts for TV rights and country selection have similar issues in the mismatch of interests,
these measures can be effective in preventing corruption in those areas as well. In order to
decrease the incentive for a given entity to offer a bribe in return for a contract or vote, sanctions
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can be applied to that entity if ever found guilty of bribery. This would increase the potential cost
of an attempted bribe. If a firm were found guilty of bribery, the firm would be prevented from
offering its services at subsequent events. Similarly, if a host country or person was found guilty
of offering money for a vote, that country could be prevented from hosting and the person could
be disallowed from participating in subsequent local organizing committees.
Contrasting with the emphasis on preventing contractors and hosts from offering bribes,
transparency emphasizes the ability to monitor the actions of those who award the contracts and
rights to host. The use of the internet in order to submit bids could help to decrease contact
between parties, while allowing all data from each bid to be available for public scrutiny.
During the construction process non-monetary issues may begin to arise with regard to
human rights abuses. As previously discussed, this could potentially be a result of the large
amount of pressure placed on contractors to finish before the event with little room for error or
delay. As such, firms may decide to increase the number of hours worked by each employee or
spend less on the amenities given to the employees, many of whom live on-site during the
construction process.
In order to prevent these behaviors, the international organizers of such events should
increase the amount of time between the selection of a host country and the execution of the
games to ensure that contracting firms are not incentivized to force employees to work more
hours or in substandard conditions. Additionally, the right to host a given mega-event should be
contingent on the completion of construction without allegations of human rights abuses. The
potential for revocation of hosting rights should be used as an incentive for host countries to have
continued oversight in the preparation for the event.
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Since there is still the potential for unnecessary long-term costs after the event in question
is complete, these costs must be given emphasis. Some white elephant buildings seem to be
secondary effects of corruption during the contract awarding process, such as in Brazil; however,
these costs can be incurred without illicit behavior taking place. Prevention of such costs will
require additional emphasis on plans for the structures following the event in the decisionmaking process.
John Nauright (2015) proposes a more radical idea: choose a permanent location for the
Summer Olympics and one for the Winter Olympics (presumably a similar approach would work
for the World Cup and other mega-events). The largest benefit would be the savings on building
new stadiums and infrastructure. An ancillary benefit would be that after the “permanent”
country has been chosen one final time for a particular event, there would be no further
corruption in the choosing of a host country. Construction for the first event held in the new
permanent country would face the same problems as the typical event, but the construction costs
for future events would be greatly diminished, as would the incentive to distort the process. It
would be a great loss if every other country lost out on the excitement of the chance to host the
Olympic Games or the World Cup, but sharply reducing corruption would help to restore some
of the events’ lost magic.
Effective reforms may take the shape of the more modest recommendations from the
OECD and others or the more extreme change of having a permanent city for each mega-event.
What is clear is that mega-events would benefit greatly from successfully controlling corruption
at every stage in the process.
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